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NOTES AND COMMENTS

If a solution is achieved in addition to the problems that now frequent the courts, however, there are others that may become significant in the future. For example, does a collateral attack on a criminal judgment become merely a civil proceeding in which the sixth
amendment does not apply? This expanding involvement of Escobedo into other areas of criminal litigation points to the need for
a more definite enunciation of its limitations. it would seem desirable for courts to be required to consider such a fundamental
right with some degree of uniformity.
WILLIAm

H. FAULK, JR.

Criminal Procedure-Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation
Made Obligatory in State Prosecutions
[T]he privilege to confront one's accusers and cross-examine
them face to face is assured to a defendant by the Sixth Amendment in prosecutions in the federal courts, and in prosecutions in
the state courts is assured very often by the constitutions of the
states. For present purposes we assume that the privilege is
reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, though this has not
been squarely held.'
So wrote Mr. Justice Cardozo some thirty-one years ago. But it
was not until 1965, in the cases of Pointer v. Texas2 and Douglas v.
Alabama, that this assumption was squarely affirmed.
In Pointer defendant was accused of robbery, and at a preliminary hearing the victim testified, giving a detailed account of the
crime and identifying Pointer as its perpetrator. Neither Pointer
nor Dillard, an alleged accomplice, were represented by counsel at
the hearing, but Dillard tried to cross-examine the victim, and
Pointer was said to have attempted cross-examination of some of
the other witnesses.4 At Pointer's trial, because the robbery victim
had moved permanently out of the jurisdiction, the state offered
as evidence a transcript of this witness's prior testimony. Pointer's
counsel objected, arguing that the right to confrontation had been
denied at the hearing. The objection was overruled because Pointer
had been "accorded the opportunity of cross examining the witSnyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934). (Emphasis added.)
2380 U.S. 400 (1965).
-380 U.S. 415 (1965).
'

'380 U.S. at 401.
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Pointer was convicted and sentenced to life imprison-

ment.' The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 7 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fourteenth
amendment makes the sixth amendment's guarantee of confrontation8 obligatory upon the states9 and confrontation had in fact
been denied to Pointer.10
In Douglas, the Court reversed a decision by an Alabama circuit
court which had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Alabama."
Douglas had been convicted of assault with intent to murder. 2
Loyd, his alleged accomplice who had been found guilty in a previous trial, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination when called as a prosecution witness. Examining
Loyd as a hostile witness,' 3 the prosecutor read from a confession
signed by Loyd and implicating Douglas. This was to "refresh his
recollection" ;14 and after reading each sentence the prosecutor
asked Loyd if he had made such a statement. Loyd steadfastly
refused to answer these questions, even when ordered to answer by
1Id. at 402.
Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). Since
defendant was convicted of robbery with firearms, he could have received the
death sentence. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1408 (1953).
7375 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
' In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (Emphasis added.)

0380 U.S. at 403-06.
"Id. at 406-08. However, the Court rejected the argument that the
facts constituted a denial of the right to counsel. Id. at 402-03.
" Douglas v. State, 163 So. 2d 477 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963). The Supreme
Court of Alabama denied review. 276 Ala. 703, 163 So. 2d 496 (1964).
12 380 U.S. at 417.
"'After Loyd's refusal to testify in defiance of an order that he do so,
the trial judge granted the prosecutor's motion to "declare [Loyd] a hostile
witness and give me the privilege of cross-examination." Id. at 416.
" Ibid. The right to use a hostile witness's written memorandum to refresh his recollection has occasionally been recognized. See Comment, The
Forgetful Witness: Refreshing Memory and Past Recollection Recorded,
3 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 616, 618 (1956). But see Voyles v. Columbia Terminals
Co., 223 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949). There the court states that it
should not be permitted "in the guise and on the pretext of refreshing
the witness' recollection, to make use of a favorable memorandum with an
actual view to contradicting the witness or inducing him to change his
testimony." Id. at 872. Use of the confession in Douglas seems clearly
guise and pretext.
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the trial judge and threatened with a contempt citation. 5 The
confession was never offered in evidence. The United States Supreme Court held that the lack of opportunity to cross-examine
Loyd as to the confession denied Douglas the right secured by the
confrontation clause.'
The right of confrontation set out in the sixth amendment is
essentially an evidentiary concept."1 Its basis is in the hearsay rule,
which rejects as untrustworthy testimony not subjected to the
scrutiny of cross-examination.'" Cross-examination is considered
indispensable because of its force as a truth-assuring device.'" There
are well-established exceptions 0 to the rule, and these have been
carried over generally as exceptions to the confrontation requirement. 2 '
But the admission of evidence that exceptions to the hearsay
rule permit does not always mean a complete denial of confrontation. When transcripts of testimony taken at a former trial or
preliminary hearing from a later unavailable witness are admitted,
frequently there has been an opportunity to cross-examine at the
prior proceeding. There has been confrontation, but has the con22
frontation been effective? This was the question in Pointer.
In Douglas, however, the objection resulted from a lack of
opportunity to test, by cross-examination, the confession at any
time. Since Loyd testified to his name and refused to testify further,
there was no opportunity to cross-examine him at the trial.23 This
" 380 U.S. at 416 & n.1. The judge did not proceed with the contempt
citation, but interrupted defendant's trial to sentence Loyd to twenty years
imprisonment.
Pr 380 U.S. at 418-20. The Court also held that Douglas' counsel had
not waived his constitutional right by failure to make timely objection. Id.
at 420-23.
"1The right of "confrontation" was synonymous at the common law with
the right to cross-examination at the time of adoption of the sixth amendment. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDErcE § 1397 at 128-29 (3d ed. 1940). But confrontation has developed to include the additional right to be "face to face" with
the witness before a judge and jury, although it is regarded as dispensable
when8 impracticable. Id. § 1365.
I' Id. § 1362 at 3.
19 Ibid.
20 E.g., dying declarations, statements of fact against interest, declarations
about family history, attestation of a subscribing witness, regular book
entries
21 in the course of business. Id. § 1426. See generally Id. § 1420-27.
1Id. § 1398 at 141.
"2There was a "confrontation," but the Court apparently considered

that Pointer could not make effective use of the opportunity to cross-examine.

" The scope of cross-examination is usually limited to matters dealt with

in direct examination or connected therewith. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1885
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contention is scarcely weakened by Loyd's already having been
convicted and perhaps not having had the right to rely on the fifth
amendment in his refusal to testify.2 4 The prosecutor's reading
of the confession and Loyd's refusing to answer were not testimony,
hence neither were subject to cross-examination by the defendant.
Nevertheless, the confession was a crucial link in the case against
Douglas, and its reading by the prosecutor may easily have been
the equivalent of testimony in the minds of the jury.
In addition to the confrontation problem Pointer presented the
closely allied question of right to counsel. The Court rejected
Pointer's argument that he had been denied the right to counsel
at the preliminary hearing within the meaning of Gideon v. Wainwright, 5 as focused by White v. Maryland.6 The Court observed
that in Texas preliminary hearings whether the accused shall be
bound over to the grand jury and, if so, whether he shall be admitted
to bail are the only questions decided. In White, the Court said,
there was a hearing in which pleas were received, and this constituted
a "critical stage" in the prosecution, entitling the defendant to
counsel. The Court reserved the question whether there might be
other circumstances making the Texas preliminary hearing a "critical stage" to the defendant for which counsel would be required.2
Yet it is difficult to say that the taking of testimony later used
against Pointer did not make the hearing a "critical stage." That
testimony was crucial to his conviction. The Court's holding in
.Escobedov. Illinois has resulted in a considerable variation among
state courts as to when the right to counsel attaches before trial.29
Pointer clearly is not the final word on this issue.
Arguments based on denial of the right of confrontation by
at 532 (3d ed. 1940). This is the rule in a majority of the states. Id. §
1890 at 548. However, wide latitude is permitted on cross-examination in
Alabama. Murphy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 60, 151 So. 2d 800 (1963). Nevertheless, since the prosecutor's reading of Loyd's confession was not evidence,
there could have been no opportunity to cross-examine.
11380 U.S. at 416. The argument against the availability of the fifth
amendment's protection is of very doubtful validity. At the time, Loyd
had not been sentenced and planned to appeal. Although Douglas' counsel

was also Loyd's counsel the Court indicated that there had been no collusion
on this point. Id. at 420.
28372 U.S. 335 (1963).

"373 U.S. 59 (1963).
'7 380
28378

U.S. at 403.
U.S. 478 (1964).

"See 44 N.C.L. Rav. 161 (1965) for a discussion of state court applications of Escobedo v. Illinois.
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state courts have occurred infrequently, since most states guarantee
confrontation, either constitutionally or by statute." Nevertheless,
prior to Pointer and Douglas, the application of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation to the states was inconsistent.31 This
inconsistency was created by conflicting statements in three cases.
In West v. Louisiana3 2 the Court pronounced, in dictum, that
the sixth amendment did not apply to proceedings in state courts.3 s
The principle was not there applicable, however, since the defendant,
through counsel, had actually cross-examined the witness at the
preliminary hearing.
In In re Oliver3 4 a Michigan judge, partially relying on testimony
of a witness whom Oliver had not confronted, sentenced the defendant to jail for contempt of court. The Court held that such a
procedure was a denial of petitioner's right to due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment:
A person's right to a reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day
in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these
rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.85
In Stein v. New York"0 petitioner was convicted on a felonymurder charge partially as a result of confessions of codefendants
who had not testified at the trial. The Court responded unfavorably
to petitioner's contention that he had been denied the opportunity
to cross-examine in violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment
" E.g., N.C. CoxsT. art. I § 11 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
every person charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and
to have counsel for defense .

. . ."

No North Carolina cases were found

that would have been affected by the decisions in the principle cases. In
fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial in a case
somewhat similar to Douglas. An accomplice testified against the defendant and then invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when
cross-examined by defendant's counsel. The court held that this deprived
the defendant of his right to cross-examine. State v. Perry, 210 N.C. 796,
188 S.E. 639 (1936). Forty-six states have constitutional provisions for
confrontation and two others grant the protection by statute. See 5 WIGMOiRE,
EVIDENCE § 1397, n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
" See McKay, The Right of Confrontation, [1959] WAsH. U.L.Q. 122,
124.
32194

U.S. 258 (1904).

Id. at 262.

,333 U.S. 257 (1948).

1 Id. at 273.
84346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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rights. Mr. Justice Jackson, for the majority, said: "[O]bjection
to the introduction of these confessions is that as to [petitioner]
they are hearsay. The hearsay-evidence rule, with all its subtleties,
anomalies and ramifications, will not be read into the Fourteenth
Amendment." 37 Stein has been much criticized, 38 principally because
te Court dispensed with the constitutional denial by saying apparently that the defendant's guilt had been established beyond a
reasonable doubt at the trial. The statements in these three cases
illustrate the difficulty resulting from the Court's application of the
doctrine that the fourteenth amendment protects only those rights
that are essential to a "scheme of ordered liberty."3 Rights
within the scope of this doctrine were subjected to the additional
test of whether their preservation in the specific case as applied to
the specific defendant were necessary to insure a fair trial. And
that determination in turn depended upon a concurrence among
the justices in their individual concepts of a "fair trial."
The full significance of Pointer'sguarantee of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation in state criminal trials is that the
right is a part.of the sixth amendment. It is an application to the
states of a specific portion of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice Harlan
termed the decision "another step in the onward march of the...
'incorporation' doctrine."40 The doctrine in its fullest force has
been championed primarily by Mr. Justice Black. 1 Simply put, it
would "incorporate" the entire Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The view adopted by a majority of the Court in recent years has been called "selective"
incorporation,42 and the decisions applying it have brought selected
guarantees of the Bill of Rights within the fourteenth amendment.
The doctrine has been long and hotly debated. 41 It will not be discussed extensively here, but it should be noted that the Pointerand
87Id.

at 196.
"sE.g., Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth Amendment and state criminal proceedings--"orderedliberty" or "just deserts," 41 CALIF. L. REV. 672 (1953).
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
,o380 U.S. at 408 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (opinion of Black, J.,
dissenting); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 865 (1960). See

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 411 (opinion of Goldberg, J., concurring).
"380 U.S. at 408 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring).

,nSee, e.g., Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. Rzv. 5 (1949).

Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Judicial Interpretation.Id. at 140.
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Douglas decisions are indicative of the progress made by those on
the Court who favor incorporation.
The concurring opinions in both cases make it clear that this
is the principal issue on which the justices differ.44 Mr. Justice
Harlan thought that the Court's present policy of "selective" incorporation "increasingly subjects state legal processes to enveloping
federal judicial authority."4 But Mr. Justice Goldberg replied
to this, observing that Mr. Justice Harlan's approach of "concept
of ordered liberty" would require the Court "to intervene in the
state judicial process with considerable lack of predictability and
with a consequent likelihood of considerable friction." 4
The effect of Pointer and Douglas will be to bring about increased vigilance by the Court in insuring that state courts grant
the full confrontation privilege of the sixth amendment.47 In addition, the decisions portend a shift in emphasis in future confrontation cases to the issue of whether specific exceptions to the hearsay
rule are carried over into the sixth amendment's confrontation
standard.48 It was announced in Malloy v. Hogan4 9 that "the Court
"In both cases Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart, while concurring in the Court's judgment on the grounds that petitioners had been
denied the right of "confrontation" implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty'
embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, dissented
from the Court's broad application of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Id. at
408-09 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring). Id. at 409-10 (opinion of
Stewart, J., concurring), Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 423 (1965)
(opinions of Harlan, J. and Stewart, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Goldberg
concurred in both the judgment and the reasoning, but took the opportunity
to set out his views on the incorporation doctrine.
"'380 U.S. at 409 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring).
"Id. at 413-14 (opinion of Goldberg, J., concurring).
" See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911). In construing a
Philippine statute modeled after the sixth amendment, the Court set out
the standard required in federal courts.
This ...

intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as

facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination.
It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions
or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the
accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the
right of cross-examination.
Id. at 330.
"'This issue has been resolved in a few fact situations in cases decided
prior to the principal decisions in federal courts. See generally, Pollitt,
The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L.
381, 400 (1959).
4°378 U.S. 1 (1964).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

has not hesitated to reexamine past decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic
liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when
they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme." 50 Pointer
and Douglas represent continuance of this reexamination by a majority of the Court. As the Court moves away from the "concept of
ordered liberty," Mr. Justice Goldberg's comment is representative:
"[T~o deny to the States the power to impair a fundamental constitutional right is not to increase federal power, but, rather, to limit
the power of both federal and state governments in favor of safe51
guarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual."
Confrontation, under these decisions becomes a right, applicable
in every case, not solely in those cases where it seems "fair" to a
majority of the Court. The uniformity alone achieved by the application of the confrontation clause to the states seems to justify
the Court's shift in constitutional theory in this area.
PiILIP L. KELLOGG
Federal Jurisdiction-Erie Doctrine-Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Hanna v. Plumer' involved personal injury claims arising out
of an automobile accident which was allegedly caused by the negligence of a deceased Massachusetts citizen. The petitioner, a citizen
of Ohio, instituted the suit against the decedent's executor, also a
Massachusetts citizen, in the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Process
was served by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with
the respondent's wife at his home. This form of service was sufficient to comply with rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ;2 however, a special Massachusetts statute required comI9Id. at 5.
"' 380 U.S. at 414.
'-380 U.S. 460 (1965).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)

(1). This rule provides that service shall be
made in the following manner:
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein. .
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